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THE EVOLUTION OF THE “SURVIVING
SPOUSE” UNDER THE ESTATES POWERS AND
TRUSTS LAW
by

Elizabeth A. Marcuccio*
Colin Dwyer**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Estates Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) the
concept of the surviving spouse was originally used as a proxy
for the person closest to and/or most dependent upon the
deceased spouse; the natural object of the deceased spouse’s
bounty. As a result the surviving spouse has priority to
administer the deceased spouse’s estate, as well as priority of
intestate distribution. In addition the surviving spouse has the
right to take an elective share of the deceased spouse’s estate.
Since these rights are significant, should they be automatically
available to all individuals who meet the statutory definition of
“surviving spouse”? What of spouses who remain married but
live apart for years? What of married partners who develop
fulfilling committed relationships with other persons, without
formally divorcing their spouse?
_______________________
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Siena College
** Adjunct Professor of Business Law, Siena College
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What of surviving spouses who wrongfully enter into
marriages with incapacitated individuals solely to manipulate a
testamentary scheme for their own financial gain? Marriage is
now understood as an economic partnership rather than a
sacred contract for life. Thus the current estate concept of
“surviving spouse” may no longer serve the purpose for which
it was originally intended.
II.

MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

An important question to address is whether an
individual should be entitled to the benefits that accrue to a
surviving spouse if she effectively is in a marriage of
convenience. In the Estate of Shoichiro Hama1 the Court
examined this issue. In Hama the spouse, Yuko Machida,
worked for the decedent and they dated with the understanding
that their relationship was not exclusive. In late 2004, with
decedent’s knowledge, Machida began a relationship with
Travis Klose, with whom she and the decedent socialized.
Early in 2005 Klose moved to Japan, and in May 2005
Machida moved into the decedent’s apartment.2
In 2006 decedent told his accountant that he intended to
sell his condominium apartment in Manhattan. Decedent was
informed that there would be a capital gains tax on the sale of
approximately $60,000. When asked by the decedent what
could be done to mitigate this tax, the accountant stated, in jest,
that if the decedent was married on the date that the apartment
was sold, there would be no capital gains tax. A few weeks
later, on July 7, 2006, decedent married Machida. Decedent
sold his apartment on September 6, 2006, and in November
2006 decedent informed his accountant that he wanted to
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divorce Machida.3 Due to the large tax savings decedent
received because of his marriage, his accountant advised him
against divorce, and recommended that he stay married for
approximately two years.
In 2007 decedent and Machida moved to Japan. Here,
with decedent’s knowledge, Machida continued her
relationship with Klose. Feeling pressure from her parents,
Machida registered in Japan as being married to Klose.
Decedent was fully aware of her plan to register as married to
Klose, and acted as a witness to said marriage, signing the
marriage certificate and affixing his personal seal.4 Despite this
“registration” or “marriage”, decedent still considered himself
legally married to Machida and entitled to the tax benefits that
resulted from that marriage. In August 2009 decedent
contacted his accountant by email and discussed his intention
to sell another apartment in New York. He also asked whether
he could now obtain a divorce from Machida. Due to the tax
savings decedent could realize on the upcoming real estate
transaction, his accountant again advised against divorce.
Decedent died without a will on September 4, 2009, leaving an
estate of approximately $1.5 million subject to administration
in New York. He was survived by his parents and Machida, his
“surviving spouse”.5
On December 4, 2009, Machida petitioned for the
issuance of letters of administration to herself and her designee,
and on January 11, 2010, decedent’s parents cross-petitioned
for the same.6 Temporary Letters of Administration were
issued to Machida’s designee. The designee of decedent’s
parents filed a motion for summary judgment seeking
revocation of the temporary letters and dismissal of Machida’s
administration petition based on the claim of spousal
abandonment.7
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III.

SPOUSAL ABANDONMENT

The Estates Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) provides
that a husband or wife is a surviving spouse unless it is
established that said spouse abandoned the deceased spouse,
and such abandonment continued until the time of death.8 The
statute contains no definition of “abandonment,” but
historically, the courts have recognized the requirements of the
Domestic Relations Law (DRL) as implicit in the EPTL.9 The
standard used to determine if a surviving spouse abandoned the
decedent is the same standard used to determine whether the
party would have been entitled to a decree of separation or
divorce on the grounds of abandonment.10 The DRL states that
the abandonment must be for a period of one or more years,11
and long-standing case law further states that departure from
the marital abode or living apart is not enough to constitute
abandonment. In Matter of Maiden the Court defined
abandonment as the unjustified departure of a spouse from the
marital home without the consent of the other spouse.12
That abandonment must include lack of consent by the
spouse that was left behind continues to be the law to this
day.13 Even if the decedent and the surviving spouse lived apart
for decades, without evidence that the spouse’s departure was
without the decedent’s consent, there is no abandonment.14 The
burden of proof as to abandonment, including lack of consent,
is on the party alleging it.15 Applying this standard to the Hama
case, the Court found that the decedent’s parents could not
meet the burden of proof. The decedent’s participation in the
registration of Machida’s marriage to Klose is the exact
opposite of the “lack of consent” needed to find
abandonment.16 The Court, however, did not rely on these
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cases when deciding Hama. Instead the Court turned to another
appellate decision, Matter of Oswald17 in deciding this case.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF OSWALD

In Matter of Oswald the “surviving spouse” alleged the
he and the decedent had entered into a common law marriage
in Pennsylvania some years prior to the decedent’s death. The
parties subsequently exchanged mutual releases, and each went
on to marry another.18 The Court found that there was
abandonment, quoting language in the trial court opinion in
Matter of Bingham19. “The court knows of no more convincing
evidence of abandonment than the public ceremonial
remarriage of the petitioner to another woman in the lifetime of
the decedent and his cohabitation with such woman as husband
and wife.”20 Here, instead of focusing on the lack of consent of
the spouse left behind, the Court’s focus is entirely on the
intent of the spouse who left, defining abandonment as
desertion of a spouse with the intent not to return, or with the
intent that the marriage should no longer exist.21 This is
contrary to prior case law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Oswald without
opinion.22 Thus it is unknown whether the Court agreed that
abandonment could be found based upon the leaving party’s
intent not to return, creating an exception to its longstanding
Maiden23 decision, or whether the Court agreed that a marriage
never existed, which was a hotly contested issue in this case. In
the end, in deciding Hama the Court found that whether
Oswald did or did not partially overrule or create an exception
to Maiden was ultimately for the Court of Appeals to
determine, and held that Machida had abandoned the decedent,
thereby losing her rights as a surviving spouse.24
V.

PUBLIC POLICY
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For decades the courts have been applying the
abandonment requirements of the Domestic Relations Law to
determine whether an individual qualifies as a surviving spouse
under the EPTL. The abandonment disqualifications of EPTL
5-1.2 (5) apply to three distinct issues relating to a deceased
spouse’s estate: the right to serve as administrator,25 the right to
an intestate share,26 and the right to elect against a will where
the surviving spouse is left less than one-third of the deceased
spouse’s estate. 27 If the deceased spouse meets the definition of
a “wronged” spouse who is eligible for a divorce based on
abandonment under the DRL, the living spouse does not
qualify as a “surviving spouse” and is not entitled to the related
benefits.
The Court in Hama examined the history of spousal
relationships under New York’s divorce law, noting that in
2010 New York did away with fault-based divorce, the system
from which the concept of abandonment first arose. Now
whether a spouse seeking a divorce was truly “wronged” by
having been left against his or her wishes, with the
accompanying burden of proving lack of consent, becomes far
less important, if not irrelevant. Therefore the strict definition
of abandonment in the DRL, which has been carried over into
the EPTL, may no longer be valid or justified.28
VI.

WRONGFUL MARRIAGES

Another issue that courts have addressed is whether a
“surviving spouse” is entitled to an elective share if the
marriage occurred while the decedent lacked the requisite
mental capacity to enter into a marriage contract. New York
does not have a statute that specifically addresses this situation.
In Campbell v. Thomas29 the decedent was diagnosed with
terminal cancer and severe dementia due to Alzheimer’s
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disease early in 2000. His daughter, who was also his primary
caretaker, took a one-week vacation in February 2001.
Decedent, who was then 72 years old, was left in the care of
Nidia Thomas, then 58. During this time Nidia and the
decedent were secretly married, and Nidia subsequently
transferred certain assets of the decedent into her name.30
In March 2001 decedent’s daughter learned of the
marriage. She confronted the decedent, who had no awareness
of the marriage and adamantly denied that it occurred.
Decedent died in August 2001.31 In November 2001 decedent’s
children commenced an action in Supreme Court seeking a
judgment declaring Nidia’s marriage to the decedent to be null
and void. The complaint was later amended to add causes of
action alleging undue influence, conversion and fraud.32 In
January 2003 decedent’s son was issued letters of
administration C.T.A., and in May 2003 Nidia filed a right of
election in Surrogate’s Court.33 Decedent’s children moved for
summary judgment in Supreme Court, submitting affidavits
detailing the decedent’s mental state over the past three years.
Due to his dementia decedent had become extremely forgetful
and experienced great confusion as to who various individuals
were. The decedent’s primary physician and neurologist
confirmed that decedent did not have the mental capacity to
provide for himself or understand his legal and financial
affairs.34 This information had been conveyed to Nidia.35
In opposition to the children’s motion for summary
judgment and in support of her cross motion for the same,
Nidia submitted her own affidavit stating that she had had a 25year, non-exclusive relationship with the decedent during
which he asked her to marry him four times. She stated that he
had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the marriage
vows, even though he did have moments of forgetfulness. The
affidavits of the pastor who performed the marriage and the
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two witnesses to the marriage each asserted that the decedent
knew he was marrying Nidia, however the pastor, when
deposed, stated that he would not have performed the
ceremony if he knew of the decedent’s medical condition.36
The Supreme Court denied both motions for summary
judgment and the decedent’s children appealed. In 2007 the
Second Department remitted the matter to the Supreme Court
for the entry of judgment declaring the marriage and all asset
transfers by Nidia null and void due to decedent’s lack of
capacity to understand his actions and inability to consent.37
The Supreme Court issued an order consistent with the ruling
of the Appellate Division.38 Nidia appealed.
VII.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

On appeal Nidia contended that pursuant to the relevant
statutes, she should be considered the decedent’s surviving
spouse at the time of the decedent’s death even if the marriage
is subsequently annulled or voided. Therefore she is entitled to
an elective share of the decedent’s estate. The Domestic
Relations Law states that if a party to a marriage is “incapable
of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding” such
marriage is voidable.39 The DRL defines a voidable marriage as
void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction.40 The Court disagreed with Nidia’s
reasoning, stating that under the DRL the distinction is not that
void marriages are nonexistent from the beginning, while
voidable marriages are valid until declared void. Rather both
void and voidable marriages are void from their beginning, the
difference between them being that parties to a void marriage
are free to treat the marriage as a nullity without the
involvement of a court, while a voidable marriage may be
treated as a nullity only if a court decrees it so.41
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The Court then examined whether its determination that
Nidia’s marriage to the decedent was null and void rendered
the marriage void from its beginning for purposes of the right
of election. The DRL provides:
An action to annul a marriage on the
ground that one of the parties thereto was
a mentally ill person may be maintained at
any time during the continuance of the
mental illness, or, after the death of the
mentally ill person in that condition, and
during the life of the other party to the
marriage, by any relative of the mentally
ill person who has an interest to avoid the
marriage.42
Yet the EPTL provides that a husband or wife is considered a
“surviving spouse” with a right of election against the deceased
spouse’s estate unless a final decree or judgment of divorce or
annulment was in effect when the deceased spouse died or that
under the DRL the marriage was void as incestuous, bigamous
or a prohibited remarriage.43 As the Court in Campbell noted,
this provision appears to render the right of family members to
obtain a post-death annulment largely illusory.44 The marriage
between Nidia and the decedent was not declared a nullity until
the Court declared it so in January 2007, more than five years
after the decedent’s death. Thus under the EPTL Nidia
technically had a legal right to an elective share as a surviving
spouse.45 However the literal terms of a statute should not be
rigidly applied if to do so would allow the statute to be an
instrument for the protection of fraud.46
VIII. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
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The Court in Campbell acknowledged that the Supreme
Court is a court of equity as well as law, and is empowered to
grant relief consistent with the principle that a person should
not be permitted to profit from her own fraud.47 Pursuant to this
doctrine, the wrongdoer is deemed to have forfeited the benefit
that would flow from her wrongdoing. The Court found that
there were ample facts to conclude that Nidia was aware of the
decedent’s lack of capacity to consent to marriage, and that she
took unfair advantage of his condition for her own pecuniary
gain, at the expense of the decedent’s heirs. Since she procured
the marriage through overreaching and undue influence, Nidia
should not be permitted to benefit from that conduct.
Therefore, she has forfeited any rights that would flow from
that marital relationship, including her statutory right to an
elective share of decedent’s estate.48
That Nidia had known the decedent for 25 years, had a
close relationship with him, and had legitimately been named
as one of the beneficiaries of his retirement account does not
reduce her culpability. These facts indicate that Nidia was in a
position of trust, which she abused, and that she could not
plausibly deny awareness of the decedent’s mental
incapacity.49 Under these circumstances equity intervenes to
prevent unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer.50 The Court found
that this result was necessary not only to protect incapacitated
individuals and their rightful heirs from overreaching and
undue influence; it was also necessary to protect the integrity
of the courts themselves.51
IX.

CONCLUSION

The current estate definition of “surviving spouse” is
largely based on the antiquated societal definition of
“marriage”. The shifting concept of what constitutes a family,
the alterations in economic dependence and the need to protect
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the elderly in an aging society all suggest the need to review
the statutory protections afforded a surviving spouse. This is
especially true when individuals marry solely to obtain
financial gain. One question deserves consideration: Does it
matter whether it was the decedent or the surviving spouse who
entered into the marriage to attain a financial windfall?
In the Estate of Shoichiro Hama52 the decedent married
Machida solely to avoid $60,000 of capital gains tax upon the
sale of his Manhattan condominium. This is evident from the
decedent’s behavior. Decedent married Machida “a few weeks”
after he learned of the tax advantages of being married. Four
months after the marriage and two months after the sale of his
condominium, decedent wanted a divorce.53 Although it is
unknown whether Machida was financially compensated for
marrying the decedent, it was the decedent who initiated the
marriage to obtain favorable treatment under the income tax
laws. The Court found that Machida had abandoned the
decedent, thereby losing her rights as a surviving spouse, even
though prior case law did not dictate this result. Did the
decedent, a sophisticated businessman who exploited the
institution of marriage for financial gain, deserve the Court’s
sympathy? He could have easily entered into a prenuptial
agreement to prevent Machida from obtaining the statutory
rights of a surviving spouse. This is not true of incapacitated
individuals who are enticed into marriage by wrongdoers.
In Campbell v. Thomas54 the decedent’s caregiver,
Nidia, was well aware of the decedent’s lack of capacity when
she secretly married him. It appears from the facts of the case
that Nidia’s sole purpose in marrying the decedent was to
obtain the financial benefits of a surviving spouse upon the
decedent’s death. Here the Court rightfully exercised its
equitable powers to prevent Nidia from benefiting from her
wrongdoing, and declared that she forfeited her rights as a
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surviving spouse. In light of these cases, who can qualify as a
“surviving spouse” under the relevant statutes deserves careful
consideration by the New York legislature.

__________________
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